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Introduction

In today’s popular imagination, for the most part history refers to a largely useless
practice concerned primarily with fact memorization and storytelling. Yet history, or historia as
the ancient Greeks called it, was the art of investigation and inquiry into knowledge. Similarly,
mathematics is often misunderstood – widely viewed as abstract and impractical beyond basic
arithmetic. These two fields seem incompatible at first glance, but they share a common pursuit.
Mathematics and history both seek to uncover ultimately unknowable truth. Historians can never
fully know the past, mathematicians struggle with the knowledge that many of their questions
and avenues of problem-solving will never be answered or solved in their lifetimes. Due to these
similarities, the two fields open a bridge of interdisciplinary inquiry not often considered.
Within the intersection, an example of unknowability arises in the world of Kurt Gödel
and his Incompleteness theorems. Gödel’s theorems dispelled the idea of a complete and wholly
provable set of axioms. Gödel created a new concern for mathematicians and logicians with his
presentation: how does the mathematics community approach our system of logic with its
limitations so clearly on display? The Incompleteness theorems represent an area of mathematics
in which some things must remain unproven to fit within our bounds of understanding. Similarly,
historians of the Interwar Period - the time between the two world wars of the twentieth century,
in which Gödel developed and presented his theorems - must handle the rise of modernism and
the fracturing of a world population with an air of unknown. Neither historians nor
mathematicians can ever know everything. There will always be unknowns, whether it be the
final iteration of an equation or the true motives of a historical figure, but this thesis will attempt
1

to marry history and mathematics to create a reasonably complete and truthful story of Gödel and
his Incompleteness theorems.
Using interdisciplinary approaches, intellectual historians analyze societal and cultural
studies through the lens of historical development. Historians of the subdiscipline center their
work around how events and occurrences affect human beings, typically intellectuals and
creatives, and thus, how the social and cultural circumstances in which an individual lives
influence their intellectual output.
The study means to show the connection between the rise of modernism in the interwar
period and the fracturing within the mathematical logic community leading to Gödel’s
presentation of the Incompleteness theorems in 1931. Traditional historiographical methods will
be deployed, along with a heavier emphasis on the mathematics used in Gödel’s proofs than seen
in past treatments. This thesis attempts to create a work of interdisciplinary communication and
cooperation in the sense that it will incorporate research methods from both fields and involve
professors from multiple fields in its advising.
This research is essential because it helps to fill a large scholarship gap between
intellectual history and the history of mathematics. Intellectual historians typically focus on
culture and its echoes in literature, philosophy, and art. Mathematicians have often criticized the
few examples of intellectual historians approaching mathematics for being too emotional in
analysis, too often lack in the actual mathematics involved. On the other hand, when
mathematicians approach histories of mathematical ideas and theorems, they tend to undervalue
the cultural and societal influences on the mathematicians themselves. In this thesis a new
methodology will be created in an attempt to marry the two approaches. Intellectual historians’
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methods can be utilized to analyze how society and culture impact an individual’s brain and
consciousness, but a strong emphasis can still be placed on the actual mathematical processes.
The case of Gödel’s Incompleteness theorems lays the perfect groundwork for this
endeavor as they beautifully reflect the time of their birth. In 1931, at the time of Gödel’s
presentations, Europe as a whole had just exited the 1920s and, along with it, the rise of
modernism. Modernism grew out of the rejection of the ideals of Enlightenment-era reason and
certainty after the First World War. Many in the Western world began to question traditionally
structured philosophy and art. Thinkers like T. S. Eliot or Ezra Pound and artistic and musical
movements such as Cubism, Dadaism, Expressionism, Surrealism, and Futurism grappled anew
with notions of traditions or sought to shatter them altogether. With the rise of modernism, those
in intellectual circles grew increasingly aware of the disorder present in the world, but after the
burning of the world during the Great War, many embraced the idea. As the First World War
tore apart large swaths of the European continent, many individuals began to see the effects of
fracturing and disorder of the physical and political world and expressed that unraveling in
cultural worlds like art and literature. Intellectual historians have widely studied these effects,
but they have never sufficiently explored these ideas within the realm of mathematical
development.
The Incompleteness theorems clearly expressed certain kinds of modernism as they
presented the idea that the system of mathematical proofs could never be wholly self-contained,
and therefore, could never be fully proven. Gödel’s theorems went against the decades of
proposed Completeness theorems, including those of prominent mathematicians Alfred North
Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. As the philosophers, authors, and artists of his time, Gödel
went against the traditionally accepted ideas of foundational logic and axiomatic systems. These
3

similarities suggest intellectual historians can apply their historiographical methods to the study
of the history of mathematics.
The end goal of this research is to expand the horizon for interdisciplinary work between
history and mathematics. This intersection is important, as there is a severe lack of
interdisciplinary options for both historians and mathematicians outside of their broad
generalization of social science and STEM, respectively. Historians occasionally cross into
political science and economic research, while mathematicians can easily find jobs in the vast
area of STEM fields, but far too few options exist for either field to bridge the gap between the
hard sciences and the humanities. This impasse can be credited to the lack of proper historical
training in mathematicians as well as the lack of formal mathematical training in historians.
Despite this, there is room for a new wave of historians of mathematics with training in both
areas to create better investigatory methods into history and mathematics as related fields.
This study aims to fill in some gaps left by traditional intellectual historians. Historians
must make better efforts to properly research and explore the world of mathematics and how it
fits into our views of social and cultural history. The lack of scholarship in this area stems from
the lack of communication between the two fields. A well-trained historian and mathematician
should have no issue in bridging the gap, however. Like fields of study in literature and art,
historians can view mathematics as an extension of a social mentality or way of thinking at a
given time. Despite its cold and analytical front, mathematics is a language and art form of its
own that intellectual historians should explore in the same manner as its sister fields in
philosophy and the arts.
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So, while arguably highly theoretical and niche, the topic of Gödel’s Incompleteness
theorems and how they reflect the rise of modernism in the Interwar period is incredibly
fascinating and vital for the fields of history and mathematics. This thesis makes a case for
further interdisciplinary work that is intensive in its historical contextualization while at the same
time emphasizing the actual mathematical development and processes involved.

5

Literature Review

The sources for this thesis come from various disciplines and periods. Different from a
traditional history monograph, many sources considered primary in this work come from
academic journal articles and other published works within the academy of mathematicians. In
addition, unlike traditional mathematics papers, a vast array of both primary and secondary
sources regarding culture and society at the time appear here. These differences from the norm
only add to the necessity of the thesis’s topic and goal, showing that a fuller sourcing of
mathematical history is often ventured.

Primary Sources

In keeping with traditional historical research, the central features of this thesis’s
scholarship come from primary sources. Given the ways mathematicians share work in their
particular community of discourse, the research area of logic and mathematics, more generally, is
flooded with easily accessible primary sources. Mathematicians often publish research in
journals, but many researchers also present their work in lectures and conference presentations.
Most primary sourcing for this thesis comes from Gödel’s research and presentations on the
completeness and incompleteness of axiomatic systems. The Collected Works, edited by
Solomon Feferman et.al., contain the Incompleteness theorems and the rest of Gödel’s work on
logic. The collection spans Gödel’s entire career in research and includes both published and
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unpublished works, correspondence, and personal writings. As this thesis centers around Gödel’s
life and work, the Collected Works will be the thesis’s centermost source.
The five-volume Collected Works also contain Gödel’s published and unpublished
mathematical papers, lectures, notes, and personal and professional correspondence. Many of
these pertain directly to Gödel’s work in completeness and incompleteness, allowing for direct
insight into the process of creation, presentation, and aftermath. The vast collection and variety
of papers also allow for analysis of Gödel and his colleagues’ immediate views on
incompleteness at the time of its publishing. The Collected Works’ expansive view into Gödel’s
life at the time of his work in incompleteness adds an indispensable level of understanding both
mathematically and personally to the primary sourcing of this piece. 1
Another valuable primary resource is Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell’s
Principia Mathematica. The work is the most complete and contemporary example of a work
exploring mathematical logic and, inadvertently, its deficiencies. Whitehead and Russell spent
hundreds of pages across three volumes analyzing various facets of mathematical logic, creating
an early set theory, and various other foundational topics. Gödel responded directly to Principia
Mathematica in his Incompleteness theorems by discrediting the work’s basis. Whitehead and
Russell’s work will help shape the mathematical narrative in what follows by providing one of
the main foundations against what Gödel argued.2
A final crucial mathematical primary source is From Frege to Gödel; a Source Book in
Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, edited by Jean Van Heijenoort. This sourcebook on
mathematical logic encompasses several critical decades and gathers the pivotal works of logic
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from them. The collection begins with Gottlob Frege’s Begriffsschrift, an extraordinary work in
logical notation, and ends with Gödel’s Incompleteness theorems. Outside of these, the
sourcebook contains presentations and letters from other noteworthy mathematicians, such as
David Hilbert, Georg Cantor, Paul Bernays, Thoralf Skolem, Russell, and Whitehead. Because
Gödel’s work in incompleteness related directly to previous works in axiomatic logic, this
sourcebook serves as a point of reference for many of the annotations and explanations given for
his proofs.
Other important mathematical texts from the foundational mathematics fields are
fundamental to this thesis’s structure and for the support of the mathematical story, as Gödel’s
work directly unseated many of the logical values held most strongly in the community at the
time. Thus, to properly contextualize the significance of his publishing of the Incompleteness
theorems, prior works must be referenced to show this difference. Therefore, Van Heijenoort’s
compilation of notable works in logic during the rise of modernism is invaluable.3

Historical Secondary Sources

Moving into the realm of secondary resources, scholarship surrounding Gödel and
modernism becomes fuzzier. To begin with, research from the perspective of historians is
severely lacking. Perhaps the closest example we have to a historical biography of Gödel comes
from Rebecca Goldstein, a philosopher. Mathematicians have criticized Goldstein's work
Incompleteness: The Proof and Paradox of Kurt Gödel for being an incredible work of
philosophy and contextualization while lacking in formal mathematical analysis. Goldstein does
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create the most complete picture of Gödel's personal history and influences, however. Despite its
flaws, Incompleteness is the only major academic work authored by a scholar specializing in a
field outside of mathematics, and thus, Goldstein's methodology is critical to study for this thesis.
This thesis will use Goldstein's work as a helpful example of philosophical and historical
contextualization to strike a balance between mathematical developments and historical context.
A better incorporation of mathematics, however, needs further sources.4
Jeremy Gray's Plato's Ghost: The Modernist Transformation of Mathematics better
expresses the methodology of this thesis. A mathematician turned historian, Gray's approach to
writing the history of mathematics resembles that of historians of science. Gray also borrows
ideas on culture and society from intellectual historians.5 Gray describes these theories in his
article “History of Mathematics and History of Science Reunited?”6 in which he breaks down
past techniques utilized in writing about the history and development of mathematics. Gray
discusses how he believes the history of mathematics scholarship could be improved upon by
drawing methods from the history of science and intellectual history. Plato's Ghost discusses the
changes in mathematics from 1880 to 1920 through a parallel lens of literature, philosophy, and
the arts. Gray focused less on specific mathematicians and theorems than this thesis, but his
focus on the age of modernism and its implications in the world of mathematics is relevant and
revolutionary in its own right. Gray's works will be indispensable guides in attempts to search for
a better approach to the history of mathematics.
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Similarly, Ronald Schleifer in Modernism and Time: The Logic of Abundance in
Literature, Science, and Culture, 1880–1930, uses mathematics an occasional tool to analyze the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, while his historical analysis does not remain
anchored in any specific fields of the humanities. Modernism and Time also evaluates the period
of modernism as a reflection and reaction to the age of Enlightenment, and despite Schleifer
coming to different conclusions than those drawn in this work, his work and comparison of
historical times are noteworthy.7

Philosophical Secondary Sources

In All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity, Marshall Berman
discusses the concept of modernization, modernism, and what it means to be modern through
various mediums. Berman defines a modern person as one who, "[is] moved at once by the will
to change–to transform both themselves and their world–and by a terror of disorientation and
disintegration, of life falling apart. They all know the thrill and the dread of a world in which, 'all
that is solid melts into air.'"8 With this definition in hand, Berman explores the rise of modernism
through Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's Faust, the philosophy of Karl Marx, selections from
French poetry and Russian literature, and finally, an explanation of New York City in the 1960s
and 1970s. Using this array of materials, Berman creates an analysis of modernization and, in
turn, modernity that can be traced back to the nineteenth century. His use of various source types
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and fields gives another example of analysis of a historical concept. This work also provides
invaluable general knowledge into the time of modernity.9
Another example of a philosophical examination of modernism comes from Allan Janik
and Stephen Toulmin's Wittgenstein's Vienna. Janik and Toulmin approach the dying AustroHungarian empire through Ludwig Wittgenstein's noted work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
They contend that Wittgenstein’s classic work encapsulates its society and culture, showcasing
the strengths and weaknesses of the twilight years of the empire. Wittgenstein's Vienna serves as
another example of an intellectual history and philosophical work focusing on how one work and
thinker reflect time and place. It also serves as an indispensable insight into the world of Vienna
in the early twentieth century.10
In mathematics and philosophy, the depth of research surrounding Gödel widens. In their
article "On the Philosophical Development of Kurt Gödel," Mark Van Atten and Juliette
Kennedy discuss Gödel's philosophical views in relation to and in contrast with his mathematical
achievements. Gödel fell into more formal philosophy alongside mathematics as he aged.
Through this lens, we can more clearly see how the changing times and society of his life
affected his mind.11
Further, in "What Hath Gödel Wrought?" John W. Dawson delves into individual
positions on philosophy Gödel held throughout his life and presented throughout papers and
correspondence with friends and colleagues. More succinctly, Dawson's article summarizes
Gödel's philosophy as represented in his mathematics career and endeavors.12 Because Dawson
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is regarded as the definitive mathematical and philosophical source on Gödel’s academic work,
many of his articles appear in this work, ranging from analyses of his theorems to summaries of
his involvement in the academic community.

Mathematical Secondary Sources

Another helpful resource for finding glimpses into the world of 1920s and 1930s
mathematics is mathematicians speaking on Gödel. An example of this comes in a memorial
article by Georg Kreisel, also an Austrian-born mathematician and logician, written upon Gödel's
death for the Royal Society's journal.13 Similarly, Dawson summarizes various mathematicians'
immediate reactions to Gödel's Incompleteness theorems in "The Reception of Gödel's
Incompleteness theorems.”14 Again, the contextualization of Gödel within his contemporaries'
views reveals how the Incompleteness theorems differed from the norm mathematically.
Another essential mathematician in the search for context is Bertrand Russell of Principia
Mathematica due to the sheer number of books and articles Russell wrote regarding
mathematics. In particular, Russell’s essay collections Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays15
and Understanding History: and Other Essays16 make far-reaching comparisons between logic
and the rest of the intellectual world. Russell and Gödel interacted briefly throughout their lives
despite the connections in their work. This primarily professional and published relationship is
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further explored in Alasdair Urquhart’s article “Russell and Gödel.17” Russell's interest in
philosophy outside of mathematics mirrors Gödel's and makes his work an avenue to investigate
what similar minds were thinking simultaneously to Gödel.

Gaps in Scholarship

A great deal of scholarship has been published on Gödel. Yet the search remains for a
historical analysis of Gödel with equal and nuanced approaches covering all areas of his life.
Currently, scholars have sectioned off every aspect of his life into distinct areas of influence.
Articles consider Gödel's mathematics, philosophy, or place in history separately, but no articles
synthesize these areas. This thesis attempts to rectify this by bringing Gödel's world back
together. This thesis will attempt to leave no interdisciplinary gaps in its analysis of the history
of mathematics.

17

Alasdair Urquhart, “Russell and Gödel,” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 22, no. 4 (December 2016): 504-520,
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13

Methodology

Many questions arose in the research process and helped to drive the narrative of this
thesis. The main questions of interest included: How can we relate the development of a
mathematical topic to the development of society and culture as a whole? How do we apply
tenets of intellectual history and the history of science to the study of the history of mathematics
and vice versa? How does Gödel’s work in Incompleteness reflect the intellectual movements
and society at the time? And finally, how did changes in society and culture influence Gödel’s
work and studies? These questions reveal the necessity of a truly interdisciplinary approach to
both research and presentation.
As primary sources are the focal point of any historical research, they must remain the
focal point in the history of mathematics research process. In order to achieve this, one must
reimagine the idea of a primary source. Traditionally, primary sources include artifacts such as
journals, letters, pictures, and videos. What follows extends the definition of a primary source to
include original publishing of mathematical research. As academic journal articles and books
present original intellectual thoughts and ideas directly from the source, this is a reasonable and
easy extension of the definition of a primary source. Furthermore, with this new inclusion, one
can more easily negotiate the terms of the agreement between historical and mathematical
research.
By reading primary mathematical sources, scholars can also come as close as possible to
finding a connection with the mathematician’s thought processes while working through their
proofs and theorems. Similar to the insight into war offered by a soldier’s diary or the peek into
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centuries of love and loss given by a family Bible, mathematical writings offer us a look into the
inner workings of mathematicians. Utilizing primary sources in mathematics, historians can pose
questions, including how the mathematician structured this proof, what drew the mathematician
to this question, and why the mathematician went about the proof in this way.
When mathematicians approach the history of their field, they tend to focus on the
ramifications of a particular theorem or area, as seen in later research and developments. In
comparison, when historians approach the history of mathematics, they emphasize the cultural
and social history of the time of discovery focusing less on the later echoes of a concept.
Mathematicians typically lack nuance in their analysis of cultural and societal influences, while
historians often leave out a proper analysis of the mathematical processes central to the story at
hand. This thesis has developed a holistic methodology, incorporating the benefits of each style
to create a middle ground between the two. This study involves research into the mathematical
background and influences on Kurt Gödel and his Incompleteness theorems. It also incorporates
a historical analysis of the period’s surrounding events, intellectual movements, encapsulated in
modernism’s rise.
In the study and presentation of history like this, an ethical concern always arises over
where to draw the line between pertinent information on a subject’s life and sensationalistic reallife events. Being a work of historical research, attempts to find a proper balance between
personal information about Kurt Gödel, an estimation of his larger influence, and the world of
which he was a part. While the basis of intellectual history lies in analyzing the effects of larger
cultural and societal events on the individual, historians can do harm by airing out unnecessarily
intimate or personal information about their subjects. The line was drawn along the areas of
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Gödel’s life affecting his mathematical work, thus excluding information that might have
prurient rather than pertinent interest.
Sources for the research were drawn from various fields, including history, mathematics,
and philosophy. These sources were found and chosen based on their relation to Gödel’s
mathematical work, his time in history, and discussions of his place within the historical context
and philosophical narratives.
In an effort to create a proper and robust synthesis of source materials, a combination of
primary and secondary source materials was gathered. Through this combination, we can quickly
draw comparisons between Gödel’s dated published works, personal writings, and
correspondence and the recorded history of the same time. To achieve this, materials were
gathered from Gödel’s writings, his mathematical writings, and his correspondence with friends
and colleagues. In addition, to provide proper historical and philosophical context, other
materials were gathered in the form of historical works discussing the time, philosophical
writings on the movements discussed, and a variety of journal articles from both fields. Finally,
several sources were collected discussing methodologies of the history of mathematics,
intellectual history, and the history and philosophy of science to acquire the most precise picture
possible of the fields and their intersections.
In the history of mathematics and Gödel’s Incompleteness theorems, scholars can draw
connections between the fuzzy and unknown nature of both historical study and modern
mathematics. By analyzing sources from history and mathematics, it becomes clear that both in
society and in the world of mathematics, the early nineteenth century was a time of much
uncertainty and fragmentation. Through this connection of unknowability, sources were

16

categorized by the initial field of research and further divided into primary and secondary
sources.
It quickly became apparent that the standard methods of the history of mathematics and
intellectual history would not suffice for this endeavor. The broad mathematical strokes of the
typical history of mathematics approach left behind any cultural and societal nuance. With a
strictly mathematical approach, we also lose an appeal to the past, as mathematicians tend to be
more future-oriented. The mathematics involved would quickly become lost in the story with a
strict appeal to intellectual history. While intellectual historians easily identify nuances, they
often lack an understanding of the rigorous mathematics involved.
In standard approaches to the history of mathematics, the subfield is often relegated to the
role of a teaching tool with few other uses or interests. History of mathematics courses typically
lack nuance as they approach the subject matter through the lens of mathematics education,
utilizing historic mathematics methods to teach younger students best. In this approach,
mathematics students miss the opportunity to learn the nuances of historical mathematics and the
times. Students currently lack any general knowledge about the mathematicians or the times
surrounding the math they study. With background information on these areas, students can more
deeply consider the implications and influences of the math with which they are presented. They
can more easily navigate and question complex ideas and problems if they already understand
the author’s foundation. More holistic approaches, including both mathematical methods and
historical methods, will help students become more invested in–and open–to the world of
mathematics as a part of the human world instead of a purely intellectual pursuit locked away in
an ivory tower.
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In writing the mathematical proof sketches, it quickly became clear difficult choices had
to be made about notation. Due to the nearly century having passed since the publishing of the
subject matter, mathematical notation and style have changed significantly. Thus, the notation
utilized by Gödel in the Completeness and Incompleteness theorems is now nearly
unrecognizable to the modern mathematician. Therefore, a combination of notation styles was
created in an attempt to capture the original essence of Gödel while remaining decipherable to a
modern reader.
Some of these notation choices include an overall simplified notation style in the
Incompleteness section, modern set builder notation throughout both sketches, and heavy usage
of repeated notation and callbacks for ease of reading.
The modified method allows us to navigate new ideas and bring deeper information to the
discussion surrounding the history of mathematics and Gödel’s work, as scholars can now
engage in the fullest and most holistic analysis of the subject. Furthermore, by including methods
from both history and mathematics, we can curate an approach to the subject that is balanced and
just for both fields.

18

Historical Considerations

In the time of Gödel, the mathematical and philosophical worlds were in a season of
significant change. As Europe reeled from the effects of the First World War, those in
intellectual circles reevaluated ways of knowing and inquiry. Suddenly, the patterns and
undercurrents of the world and humanity appeared less solid than ever before. Thus, a movement
arose, known today as modernism, characterized by fragmentation of thought, experimentation
with form and precedent, and often by the rejection of Enlightenment certainties. In other areas
of intellectual life, modernism appeared in stream-of-consciousness novels, free verse poetry,
atonal and polytonal music, expressionism, Cubism, Dadaism, and many other notable artistic
movements. These movements represent easier-to-see examples of how modernism affected the
human intellect and its expression, yet modernism also played a significant role in the more
aesthetic disciplines of philosophy and mathematics at the same time.
For the purposes of this work, modernism in mathematics is studied through the lens of
Kurt Gödel and his Completeness and Incompleteness theorems. These works represent a small
section of Gödel’s vast repertoire of mathematical and philosophical publishings, but they
highlight a transition in mathematical thinking from a world of certainty to that of
incompleteness. Gödel’s Completeness theorem was a work more traditionally steeped in that of
his predecessors. The Completeness theorems confirmed conjectures made by mathematicians
before him relating to the consistency and stability of mathematics, utilizing traditional tools to
do so. On the other hand, the Incompleteness theorems were unconventional in that Gödel
proved a conjecture relating to the lack of completeness and consistency of the foundations of
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the field by forming a structure based on proof techniques he created. With the dichotomy
presented between these theorems and proofs, the effects of modernism on Gödel and his
mathematics become clear. The following personal and social history of Gödel, his life and time,
and those surrounding him is only an overview of the effects of the world on Gödel and how it
contrasted with the lives of his colleagues.
Gödel’s training in mathematics was similar to the other mathematical giants of his time,
but the world and events that shaped him thrust Gödel into a different intellectual mindset from
that of the older generations. Gödel was born in Brünn, Austria-Hungary, now Brno, Czech
Republic, in 1906. From his early childhood until his death in 1978, Europe remained in nearconstant political and social turmoil. With the outbreak of the first world war in 1914, AustriaHungary, already in a fragmented and precarious position, further dissolved into a structureless
state with the death of its heir presumptive Franz Ferdinand and the ensuing chaos of war.18
By the end of the war, the Austro-Hungarian empire lay in shambles due to significant
loss of military personnel and civilian life and the near-complete destruction of governmental
infrastructure. As a member of the Central Powers, Austria-Hungary was partitioned by the
Allied Powers in the Treaty of Germain-en-Laye.19 Brünn, Gödel’s birth city and place of
residence until he moved to Vienna in 1924, was redistricted into the First Republic of
Czechoslovakia, and the predominantly German-Austrian city fell into the ethnic minority of the
new republic. With this, Gödel, a member of the Austrian minority, received the second of his
four official nationalities at age 12. Historians note that many Austrians of the new Republic of
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Czechoslovakia never adjusted to their new nationality and country, and Gödel in particular
struggled with his loss of official Austrian status and homeland.20
As Gödel learned the basic ways of mathematical thinking in the turmoil of a war torn
country, the fight for the foundation of mathematics was gearing up. In the early twentieth
century, the foundations of mathematics community was heavily influenced by George Cantor
and the new field of set theory. Cantor’s work inspired mathematicians to take a closer and
different look at the basis of the systems defining mathematics. Cantor’s proofs, including those
of transfinite numbers, cardinality, and one-to-one correspondence amongst an extensive array of
others, stand as some of the most monumental mathematical achievements of the modern era.
While Cantor’s ways of proof and theorems remain fundamental to mathematics today and
surely influenced Gödel as a mathematician, Gödel’s major intellectual influences lie closer to
him in time.
One of Gödel’s major influences mathematically was Principia Mathematica by Bertrand
Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. Principia Mathematica is referenced in the opening
paragraphs of both the Completeness and Incompleteness theorems, and Gödel states the
Incompleteness theorems in particular use many of the systems established in Russell and
Whitehead’s work.21 Russell and Whitehead set out to create a foundational axiomatic system
from which all theorems and formulas of mathematics could be derived. Furthermore, they
believed it was possible and necessary to create a system that was as concise and encompassing
as possible. Russell and Whitehead’s ideas stemmed from the greater umbrella of logicism.
Logicism is an area of the philosophy of mathematics initially presented by Gottlob Frege in
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which some mathematicians believe all of mathematics can be reduced to or modeled by systems
of logic.22 In the late nineteenth century, Giuseppe Peano and Richard Dedekind worked to
expand the ideals of logicism laid out by Frege utilizing arithmetic systems, but Russell and
Whitehead’s work is the most consolidated and exhaustive effort of logicism of the time.
In contrast to Gödel, both Russell and Whitehead hailed from England, and both were
born in the mid-nineteenth century. Russell and Whitehead benefitted from the separation of the
British Isles from the main European continent, as this separation removed them from immediate
exposure to much social and political upheaval, and they had both completed their formal
training in mathematics well before the outbreak of world war. Their work and desires in
mathematics highlight this relative stability as both wished to show that the foundations of
mathematics were as solid as the consensus believed.
Despite the significant influence of Russell and Whitehead on Gödel’s works in
Completeness and Incompleteness, the parties involved had minimal contact in person or via
letter throughout both the years in question or later in life. Gödel was, however, a common
correspondent with Paul Bernays, assistant to David Hilbert at Göttingen, who worked
extensively in the axiomatic systems set out by Principia Mathematica. Bernays presented
lectures on the subject in a postdoctoral lecturer position beginning in 1919, but his work on the
subject remained unpublished until 1926.23 As Bernays was Gödel’s most prolific correspondent,
Gödel utilized Bernays’ expertise on the subject to fill in the gaps left by his distance from
Russell and Whitehead. Gödel and Bernays also used their correspondence as a way of distanced
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intellectual soundboarding. For example, Gödel sent drafts of his Completeness24 and
Incompleteness25 theorems to Bernays, and in response, Bernays replied in earnest with detailed
reflections on their content and questions concerning the theorems and possible expansions.
Similarities in circumstance and upbringing can partially explain Gödel and Bernays’
easy connection. While Bernays was Gödel’s elder by nearly two decades, both men lived lives
of social upheaval. Bernays, of Swiss descent, was a Jew living in Germany in the twentieth
century, and during his correspondence with Gödel on the topic of Incompleteness, he was only
two years away from being fired for his Jewish heritage.26 Bernays’ struggles, paired with
Gödel’s ostracization from Austria-Hungary early in life and subsequent inner struggle, created
two men already familiar with intellectual strife. Thus, Gödel and Bernays were open to
questioning the foundations of mathematics as they were forced to question the foundations of
their world.
While Russell and Whitehead’s ideas of logicism dominated the mathematical scene and
Gödel’s world in the early twentieth century, the work of Hilbert brought the ways of formalism
back into mathematical circles. Formalism was a movement in the foundations of mathematics
community spearheaded most prominently by David Hilbert. Supporters of formalism believe
mathematics and logic can be represented as strings of symbols and formulas. Formalists also
believe these strings have no meaning unless one is assigned to them by rules of inference or
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transformation.27 Hilbert’s formalism is most prevalent in his synonymous program introduced in
1921, with its beginnings tracing back to the early-twentieth century.
Hilbert’s program aimed to create a more stable foundation for mathematics and rectify
the paradoxes discovered by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica. To accomplish
this, Hilbert proposed a two-pronged approach. First, he desired to find consistency in proofs of
mathematics, and secondly, he proposed to utilize a finitary and complete set of axioms for all
proofs to do so.28 Hilbert was also the first mathematician to prove a system of logic known as
“first-order logic,” an idea that Frege and Peano had only proposed in the late nineteenth
century.29 Gödel’s work benefited greatly from Hilbert’s as Gödel’s systems were based on finite
first-order logic systems popularized by Hilbert, and Gödel’s works both added to and conflicted
with the ideas set forth by Hilbert on the foundations of mathematics. Similarly to Russell and
Whitehead, Hilbert was born in the mid-nineteenth century, but unlike them, he was born near
Königsberg, Prussia, a city now in Russia.30 Hilbert’s life in eastern Europe allowed him to be
exposed to a variety of cultures and ideas. This allowed him to develop great creativity and to
achieve much in mathematics, but the lack of dramatic social change and war in his formative
years can be seen in his faith in consistency.
At the same time as Russell, Whitehead, and Hilbert, a group was meeting at the
University of Vienna, nearly synonymous with early-twentieth century thought. The Vienna
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Circle served as a bridge from the mathematical world of 1930s Vienna to the philosophical.
Unofficially founded in 1924 and led most famously by Moritz Schlick, the Vienna Circle was a
gathering of academics from various fields, including mathematics, logic, philosophy, and the
social and natural sciences. The core beliefs of the Vienna CIrcle centered around logical
empiricism, a belief centered around the verification of all knowledge through logic and proof.
The group was significantly influenced by the beliefs of Hilbert, Frege, and Russell, but they also
drew inspiration from Ernst Mach, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Albert Einstein.
Gödel is known to have attended meetings of the Vienna Circle, but he was not an active
participant. Several of his professors and mentors at Vienna were active members including Hans
Hahn, his doctoral advisor, Rudolf Carnap, Friedrich Waismann, and Karl Menger, with Hahn
being known as the original organizer of the group. Thus, Gödel is considered to be an
intellectual offspring of the group.31 While the Vienna Circle clearly influenced Gödel with his
attendance of meetings and tutelage under its leaders, Gödel’s works, in many ways, work
against some of its core tenets. The figureheads of the Vienna Circle were known to be followers
of Enlightenment ideals, while Gödel’s works shy away from the certainty of the era.
As Gödel attended the University of Vienna for his higher education, he was introduced
to the status quo of mathematics and logic. As many of his professors and his doctoral advisor
were members of the Vienna Circle, Gödel was exposed to the most influential mathematical and
philosophical ideas of his time from the beginning of his education in Vienna and even more so
from the beginning of his attendance of meetings in the late 1920s.32 Russell’s work Introduction
to Mathematical Philosophy spurred on Gödel’s interest in mathematical logic as introduced to
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him in a Vienna seminar, and from this, he formed an initial intellectual foundational basis of
logicism. However, in 1928 Hilbert and Ackermann published Grundzüge der theoretischen
Logik (Principles of Mathematical Logic) which Gödel had previously attended a lecture on by
Hilbert. With his introduction to the two central philosophical schools of early career complete,
Gödel then continued on to craft his Completeness and Incompleteness theorems in quick
succession.
While studying the completeness and consistency of axiomatic systems in Vienna, Gödel
would have also been exposed to a city full of cultural and social freedom and expression.
Vienna is considered a center of modernism in Europe, and this can be seen throughout the city’s
history as it played host to composers like Johannes Brahms, Gustav Mahler, Richard Bruckner,
and Richard Georg Strauss, architect Adolf Loos, infamous psychologist Sigmund Freud, and
some of the most influential politicians of the twentieth century Adolf Hitler, Josip Broz Tito,
Joseph Stalin, and Leon Trotsky. The confluence of the height of twentieth century society in
Vienna cannot be overstated, and its impact on individuals already in the throes of modernity,
such as Gödel, is easy to see.
Where the works of Russell, Whitehead, Hilbert, and Bernays build upon and work
within systems already created, Gödel’s works, the Incompleteness theorems, in particular,
utilize the foundations of his predecessors’ work, discover their intrinsic flaws, and create new
systems from their work, taking note of what worked and what had to be created from the ground
up. Gödel’s theorems are a pinnacle of mathematical creativity as he consolidates the efforts of
several mathematicians into one successful proof utilizing the techniques and notation of several
other mathematicians along the way. With this creativity and willingness to go out of the beaten
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mathematical path, Gödel’s intellectual separation from the older generations of his time
becomes more apparent.
Godel is a modernist because his Incompleteness theorems exemplify values of
modernism in the world of mathematics. The presentation of incompleteness and inconsistency
of axiomatic systems represents the fragmentation of foundations of mathematical thought
mirrored in other areas of intellectual output. He rejects Enlightenment certainty as he transitions
from his work on the completeness of axiomatic systems to that of incompleteness and
unknowable questions. FInally, Godel proposes a new form in his proof of the Incompleteness
theorems as he introduces the idea of Godel numbering and his extensive use of it.
As stated earlier, Gödel’s life has many similarities in contrast with other mathematical
giants of his time, but the circumstances of his time and place of birth and upbringing created a
unique intellectual environment from which a young mathematician could grow. While many of
the older generations of his time came from a western Europe free of instability and violence,
Gödel rose from a time of uncertainty marked by destruction, death, and dissolution of norms. As
seen in other areas of intellectualism, modernism flourished under these circumstances, and
through Gödel, it is seen that mathematics as well was taken to new heights during a time of
great hardship. While challenging and difficult for many in the mathematics community to
receive, Gödel’s work in incompleteness was entirely reflective of its time and was a necessary
addition to the foundations of mathematics in the changing cultural and social scene of the 1920s
and 1930s.
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The Completeness Theorem

Gödel created the Completeness theorem only in reference to specific logical formulas,
but he did generalize the ideas of completeness beyond what had already been shown. The issue
that next arose, and which Gödel answered in his Incompleteness theorems, is the ability to
generalize ideas of completeness to all systems of logic as opposed to just the formulas presented
in the Completeness theorem. While both theorems refer to some idea of completeness, they can
both remain relevant to the structures of logic as the completeness at question in both is defined
differently.
In the Completeness theorem,33 Gödel tackles if the structures of first-order logic are
complete. This means that Gödel proved that every valid statement 𝐴 in a formalized theory 𝑇,
defined similarly to the systems presented by Hilbert and Ackermann, Russell and Whitehead,
and Bernays, and any model of 𝑇 is a model of 𝐴, 𝐴 is formally provable using 𝑇 as the set of
axioms. Thus, through the Completeness theorem, Gödel proved the connection between
semantic truth and syntactic provability. Generally speaking, he showed that we can clearly
create models of deductions semantically in proofs and that provability is only dependent on
axioms.
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Proof Sketch

Gödel begins his proof of the completeness of axiomatic systems with a description of the
system he will be working with and its properties. Gödel utilized several logical systems such as
natural deduction and Hilbert systems. Natural deduction is one of the oldest systems of logic
created by using rules of inference to go through argumentation while remaining as close to our
natural processes as possible. Meanwhile, Hilbert systems tend to focus much more intensely on
the use of axioms rather than traditional ways of reasoning. Using these two kinds of systems
and a breadth of background knowledge from Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica
(PM), Gödel constructs a proof detailing the claim that any valid statement is provable.
Utilizing a Hilbert system, Gödel presents the theorem as a series of ten sub-theorems.
Many of these sub-theorems build upon each other and expand earlier theorems into more
generalized versions of each other. He then utilized these theorems and their proofs to create his
overall proof for the Completeness theorem.
Theorem I. Every valid formula of the restricted functional calculus is provable.34
Gödel begins the proof with the statement of theorem 1, which is the most basic form of
the Completeness theorem, along with a description of the specifics of the system we will be
working within. Gödel utilizes a system of formal first-order logic that allows logical quantifiers
to describe things outside of the classical logical world. Next, Gödel states our assumed set of
axioms of the Hilbert-Ackermann system and defines our rules of inferences. While he specifies
a specific set of axioms, Gödel's work holds for other systems of formal first-order logic as well.
Gödel then assumes the truth of all of our set of axioms and rules of inference. Finally, it is
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noteworthy that Gödel’s set of axioms and inferential schema does not mention the identity
property of elements in this system. This initial set of axioms is as follow:
1. 𝑋 ∨ 𝑋 → 𝑋,
2. 𝑋 → 𝑋 ∧ 𝑌,
3. 𝑋 ∨ 𝑌 → 𝑌 ∨ 𝑋,
4. (𝑋 → 𝑌) → (𝑍 ∨ 𝑋 → 𝑍 ∨ 𝑌),
5. (∀𝑥)𝐹(𝑥) → 𝐹(𝑦), and
6. (∀𝑥)[𝑋 ∨ 𝐹(𝑥)] → 𝑋 ∨ (∀𝑥)𝐹(𝑥).
Theorem II. Every formula of the restricted functional calculus is either refutable or satisfiable
(and, moreover, satisfiable in the denumerable domain of individuals).35
Gödel continues with a restatement of theorem I in theorem II. These two statements are
equivalent by definition of “valid,” as seen in theorem I. Gödel defines a “valid” statement to be
a statement that fulfills the conditions that the statement 𝐴 is valid must be equivalent to ~𝐴 is
not satisfiable.36 Thus, all statements must be satisfiable or refutable in a system to determine if a
statement is valid.
Theorem III. If every K-expression is either refutable or satisfiable, so is every expression.37
Continuing, Gödel now defines the idea of a class K of 𝐾 expressions. For an expression
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𝐾 to be a member of K, 𝐾 must meet the following three conditions:
1. 𝐾 is a normal function. This statement is a callback to Lemma 5 of the proof in which
Gödel states, “[e]very expression can be brought into normal form; that is, for every
expression 𝐴 there is a normal formula 𝑁 such that 𝐴 ↔ 𝑁 is provable.”38
2. 𝐾 contains no free individual variables.
3. The prefix of 𝐾 begins with a universal quantifier, ∀, and ends with an existential
quantifier, ∃.
To prove the validity of this statement, Gödel crafts a statement 𝐴 that is not in class K.
With statement 𝐴, Gödel utilizes its normal form 𝑃(𝑁) to show there exists a statement 𝐵 in K
that is provable with a biconditional equivalent to 𝑃(𝑁). Thus, due to the axiom system,
inferential scheme, and lemmas set up by Gödel, 𝐴 must also be refutable or satisfiable.
Theorem IV. If every expression of degree k is either satisfiable or refutable, so is every
expression of degree k+1.39
Gödel then defines the degree 𝑘 of every 𝐾 expression in K as the number of universal
quantifier blocks in the expressions prefix that are separated by an existential quantifier. This
block of quantifiers is also referred to as the degree of the prefix of the expression. Let (𝑃)𝐴 be
an expression of class K of degree 𝑘+1 where (𝑃)=(∀𝑥)(∃𝑦)(𝑄). The expression (𝑄) is of
degree 𝑘 and (𝑄)=(∀𝑢)(∃𝑣)(𝑅) where the statement (𝑅) is of degree 𝑘-1.
Thus, Gödel constructed a statement containing within itself statements of the same
construct of descending degree. From this, Gödel utilizes extensive substitution, association, and
simplification to show that (𝑃)𝐴 is equivalent to his constructed sentences and is thus refutable.
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As (𝑃)𝐴 is refutable, it satisfies the condition of a statement being either refutable or satisfiable,
and thus, the theorem holds for both statements of degree 𝑘 and degree 𝑘+1.
Theorem V. Every formula of degree 1 is either satisfiable or refutable.40
Finally, Gödel proves that every formula of degree 1 is either satisfiable or refutable. To
do so, he creates a formula (𝑃)𝐴 of degree 1 and sets the contents of the formula. Every formula
(𝑃)𝐴 will contain (∀𝑥)(∃𝑦)𝐴(𝑥; 𝑦) such that 𝑥 is an 𝑟-tuple of variables and 𝑦 an 𝑠-tuple of
variables. Consequently, Gödel defines a sequence 𝐴𝑛 of formulas of (𝑃)𝐴 such that
𝐴𝑛 =𝐴(𝑥𝑛 ; 𝑦𝑛 ) & 𝐴𝑛−1.
Theorem VI. For every n
(𝑃)𝐴 → (𝑃𝑛 )𝐴𝑛
is provable.41
Further, 𝑃𝑛 (𝐴𝑛 ), the normal form of (𝑃)𝐴, is defined as (∀𝑥𝑛 )(∃𝑦𝑛 )𝐴(𝑥𝑛 ; 𝑦𝑛 ). Gödel
proves the implication of (𝑃)𝐴 → (𝑃𝑛 )𝐴𝑛 by way of traditional induction. The base case of
𝑃1 (𝐴1 ) quickly falls out from the definitions (𝑃)𝐴 and 𝑃𝑛 (𝐴𝑛 ). Thus, Gödel’s main objective is
the proof of the 𝑛 case and the 𝑛+1 case. To do this, Gödel utilizes a previous lemma stating that
if 𝑥 consists of distinct variables and 𝑥′ consists of the same variables in a different ordering,
then (∀𝑥)𝐹(𝑥) → (∀𝑥′)𝐹(𝑥′) and a rule of inference which states that individual variables may
be replaced by other variables as long as there is no overlap.
Using these, Gödel presents that for every 𝑛, (𝑃)𝐴 & (𝑃𝑛 )𝐴𝑛 → (𝑃1 )𝐴1 is provable as we
can then derive (∀𝑥)(∃𝑦)𝐴(𝑥; 𝑦) → (∀𝑥𝑛+1 )(∃𝑦𝑛+1 )𝐴(𝑥𝑛+1 ; 𝑦𝑛+1 ). Using another lemma
which states that if 𝑥 and 𝑥′ differ only in order of variable, then (∃𝑥)𝐹(𝑥) → (∃𝑥′)𝐹(𝑥) is
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provable, Gödel further equates this to (𝑃𝑛 )𝐴𝑛 → (∃𝑥𝑛+1 )(𝑃𝑛′ )𝐴𝑛 . Further, Gödel shows through
substitution that (𝑃)𝐴 → (𝑃𝑛 )𝐴𝑛 is provable for any 𝑛, and thus, theorem VI holds.
Extensions
Gödel continues the proof to introduce the idea of a “satisfying system of level n of
(𝑃)𝐴.”42 A satisfying system consists of an 𝐴𝑛 and a corresponding 𝐵𝑛 . 𝐴𝑛 takes the form
𝐹1 (𝑥𝑝1 , . . . , 𝑥𝑞1 ), 𝐹2 (𝑥𝑝2 , . . . , 𝑥𝑞2 ), . . . , 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , . . . , 𝑋𝑙 , where the functional variables are
represented by 𝐹1 and the propositional variables by 𝑋1. Statements of 𝐴𝑛 are compounded by
the operations ∨, or, and ￣, negation and are made up of elementary components. 𝐵𝑛 consists of
the same operations as 𝐴𝑛 , with the elementary components replaced by propositional variables.
Gödel then shows that a satisfying system of level 𝑛 is found in a system where the
domain of functions is within the set of integers of minimum value 0 and maximum value ns
where n is the level and s for the number of s-tuples within 𝐴𝑛 where all elementary components
of 𝐴𝑛 are replaced by their corresponding propositional variables in 𝐵𝑛 . Satisfying systems of
level n also can only exist if and only if 𝐵𝑛 is satisfiable. As 𝐵𝑛 is propositional, it can be fully
satisfiable at all levels, or there exists some level of 𝐵𝑛 where 𝐵𝑛 is not satisfiable, and thus, 𝐵𝑛
is refutable. For both of these cases, due to the relations established above, if 𝐵𝑛 is satisfiable or
refutable, 𝐴𝑛 and thus (𝑃)𝐴 will be satisfiable or refutable.
Gödel then extends the system to the domain of all integers greater than or equal to zero
with the system 𝑆 = {𝛷1 , 𝛷2 , . . . , 𝛷𝑘 ; 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 , . . . , 𝛼𝑙 }. The system 𝑆 holds if the following two
stipulations hold. Firstly, 𝛷𝑝 (𝑎1 , . . . , 𝑎𝑘 ), where 1 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑘, holds if and only if at least one 𝑆𝑚 ,
(𝑚)

and all that follow, ∫𝑝
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, where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙, for some

𝑆𝑚 and all that follows. With these definitions and stipulations, (𝑃)𝐴 becomes evidently true and
thus satisfiable. With the satisfiability of (𝑃)𝐴, Gödel completes the initial proof of the
Completeness theorem.
Theorem VII. Every formula of the extended realm is provable if it is valid (more precisely, if it is
valid in every domain of individuals).43
Gödel expands the definitions of theorem I and theorem II, as well as the theorem itself,
by adding two axioms to the initial system:
7. 𝑥 = 𝑥
8. 𝑥 = 𝑦 → [𝐹(𝑥) → 𝐹(𝑦)].
With these added axioms, Gödel brings the identity property into the system. Gödel utilizes both
theorems VII and VII for the following proof.
Theorem VIII. Every formula of the extended realm is either refutable or satisfiable (and,
moreover, satisfiable in a finite or denumerable domain of individuals).44
To prove these two statements are equivalent to those previously seen, Gödel constructs a
new proof. Take a statement 𝐴 that represents an arbitrary formula of the extended realm,
(𝑥)(𝑥 = 𝑥). Then, he creates a statement 𝐵 such that 𝐵 is the conjunction of 𝐴 and any formula
we can create by substitution of the functional variables for 𝐹 in 𝐴, as seen in axiom 8,
(𝑥)(𝑦){𝑥 = 𝑦 → [𝐹(𝑥) → 𝐹(𝑦)]} for all singularly functional variables of 𝐴, and (𝑥)(𝑦)(𝑧){𝑥 =
𝑦 → [𝐹(𝑥, 𝑧) → 𝐹(𝑦, 𝑧)]} and (𝑥)(𝑦)(𝑧){𝑥 = 𝑦 → [𝐹(𝑧, 𝑥) → 𝐹(𝑧, 𝑦)]} for all binary functional
variables. 𝐵 continues in the same form as we continue into 𝑛-ary level functions.
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Gödel then sets 𝐵′ to be the formula created when every “=” sign in 𝐵 is replaced with a
functional variable 𝐺 not in 𝐵. As 𝐵′ is now propositional in form, it is now either refutable or
satisfiable. As 𝐵 produces 𝐵′ through direct substitution, if 𝐵′ is refutable so is 𝐵, and thus, 𝐴 is
also refutable as 𝐵 is a logical product of 𝐴.
Likewise, Gödel then assumes 𝐵′ is satisfiable in the denumerable domain Σ of
individuals in the system 𝑆. By the formation of 𝐵′, we can deduce that a formula formed within
the system will be symmetric, reflexive, and transitive, and thus, it creates a partition of the
elements of 𝛴 in 𝑆. Within the equivalence classes of 𝑆, the system will continue to hold or to not
hold as we substitute the variables of the same class for another. If we can identify with one
another all elements of the same class, then that relation function becomes a part of the identity
relation. This also means 𝐵 is satisfiable, and therefore, so is 𝐴. Therefore, 𝐴 is either satisfiable
or refutable.
Theorem IX. Every denumerably infinite set of formulas of the restricted functional calculus
either is satisfiable (that is, all formulas of the system are simultaneously satisfiable) or
possesses a finite subsystem whose logical product is refutable.45
Gödel considers one last generalization of theorems I and II by looking at denumerably
infinite sets of logical expressions.
Theorem X. For a denumerably infinite system of formulas to be satisfiable it is necessary and
sufficient that every finite subsystem be satisfiable.46
In the proof of these two theorems, Gödel begins by constraining the system to normal
functions of degree 1. He shows that for every system 𝛴 of functions there exists a system of
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normal functions 𝛴′ from which we can determine the satisfiability of 𝛴 following the methods
shown in theorems III and IV. Thus, he proposes
(∀𝑥1 )(∃𝑦1 )𝐴1 (𝑥1 ; 𝑦1 ), (∀𝑥2 )(∃𝑦2 )𝐴2 (𝑥2 ; 𝑦2 ), . . . , (∀𝑥𝑛 )(∃𝑦𝑛 )𝐴𝑛 (𝑥𝑛 ; 𝑦𝑛 ) represents the
denumerable system 𝛴 of normal expressions of degree 1. Following the patterns set in proofs of
earlier theorems, Gödel creates a sequence 𝐵𝑛 such that 𝐵𝑛 contains the 𝑟𝑖 -tuples and the
𝑠𝑖 -tuples. Thus, (𝑃𝑛 )𝐵𝑛 is the formula representing the sequence 𝐵𝑛 and the first 𝑛 expressions
of the system 𝛴. Therefore, if every subsystem of 𝛴 is satisfiable, so is every 𝐵𝑛 , and if every 𝐵𝑛
is satisfiable, so is the entire system 𝛴. Thus, theorems IX and X are proven.
Further Extensions and Considerations
Gödel discusses that if one were to remove the propositional variables of the system
described in theorems IX and X, we would be left with a system of axions with functional
variables acting as primitive notions. Thus, by theorem IX, we can find a model in the system, or
it is inconsistent.
Finally, Gödel explains the implications of this theorem for the independence of axioms.
Gödel explains that the independence of axioms 1-4 from each other has already been proven by
Bernays, but their independence from the other axioms can be proven in the same manner.

Influences

Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica is the clearest mathematical influence
on the Completeness theorem. Gödel begins the theorem by crediting PM with the idea of
formulating an initial set of self-evident axioms and using them to derive all theorems of logic
and mathematics. Gödel uses PM as a jumping-off point for the Completeness theorem as he
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claims, “the question at once arises whether the initially postulated system of axioms and
principles of inference is complete, that is, whether it actually suffices for the derivation of every
logico-mathematical proposition, or whether, perhaps, it is conceivable that there are true
propositions . . . that cannot be derived in the system under consideration.”47 Thus, Russell and
Whitehead’s work is a cornerstone for Gödel’s ideas and the Completeness theorem.
Gödel utilizes the system of functional calculus created by Hilbert and Ackermann in
Principles of Mathematical Logic as the notation basis for the theorem. This system, known as
the first formalism of first-order logic, uses a system of restricted functional calculus with
propositional and functional variables to create this first-order logical system. From this system,
Gödel also takes his definition of validity: “A formula of this kind is said to be valid
(tautological) if a true proposition results from every substitution of specific propositions and
functions for 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍,... and 𝐹(𝑥).”48 In the text, Hilbert and Ackermann also whether the
semantic49 truth of any statement in a system of first-order logic was a theorem that could be
derived from any first-order logic axiom or rule. It was this question that Gödel responded to in
the affirmative with his Completeness theorem50 Hilbert and Ackermann’s paper also discusses
the paradoxes brought forward in PM by Russell and Whitehead, Russell’s paradox and the Liar
paradox, in particular, further creating the web of influence.51
Gödel also frequently references an unpublished lecture of Paul Bernays in which he
discusses many aspects of PM and other characteristics of this area of mathematical logic.
Bernays’ confirmed in 1928 that the axioms presented in PM were, in fact, complete in the sense
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that they produced every correct formula of the propositional calculus.52 Gödel also draws on
Bernays’ 1928 work to craft his axiom system and rules of inference as Bernays proved many
foundational characteristics of the validity of formulas in a complete axiom system.53
One interesting structural influence is found in the introduction of the normal form of a
formula 𝐹 referred to in the proof sketch as (𝑃)𝐹) and its relationship to the satisfiability of the
formula itself, as Gödel references the proof of the Löwenheim theorem by Thoralf Skolem in
1928 as his inspiration for this technique. Skolem’s proof creates the normal form of a formula
which takes the form of strings of universal and existential quantifiers followed by a formula
without quantifiers, and he then shows that a formula can only be satisfiable if and only if its
normal form is satisfiable.54 Gödel utilizes Skolem’s normal form of formulas in the proof for
completeness while proving theorem IV.55
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The Incompleteness Theorems

With the Incompleteness theorems, Gödel approaches the idea of fully formalized
systems and fields of mathematics. Gödel states that while the two significant and prominent
mathematical systems of the time, Principia Mathematica (PM) and the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom
system of set theory (ZF), may appear all-encompassing and extending, there still exists several
basic questions of mathematics that cannot be answered within these systems. Gödel then asserts
this is not at the fault of the systems themselves but rather the nature of axiomatic systems as a
whole.56
Gödel first defines a proof as a finite list of logical formulas and symbols. These include,
for our purposes, the natural numbers. He then introduced the concept of a Gödel number which
would encode any of these formulas and symbols into a unique number based on the logical
operators and numbers within the given relation. He then determines the Gödel number of more
extended formulas by a deductive relation. Finally, he defines a self-referential mathematical
sentence and shows by way of contraction that not all true sentences can be proven within their
system.

Proof Sketch

Gödel begins the proof with a description of the system he will be utilizing for his
theorem. Similar to the Completeness theorem, the basis of the system is derived from Russell
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and Whitehead’s PM and the Zermelo-Fraenkel system, ZF. Gödel proposes that while these
systems appear to hold and answer any mathematical question, he will be able to show that this is
not always the case and, in fact, can never be the case. Further, he states that the issues of the
systems lie in fairly basic questions surrounding integers that cannot be decided on the basis of
axioms.57

Defining the System

Gödel confines the system created in the proof to that of PM. This system can be seen
simply as a finite sequence of primitive notions, variables, logical constants, and parentheses or
punctuations. Similarly, Gödel defines a proof as a finite sequence of formulas. For our purposes,
Gödel lets the natural numbers be the primitive signs, and thus, a formula is a finite sequence of
natural numbers. Further, a proof array is defined as a finite sequence of finite sequences of
natural numbers. These sequences allow us to find a statement form, later called the class sign,
𝐹(𝑥), in which 𝑥 is a free variable and 𝑥 is provable within PM. Gödel utilizes this statement
form to create his undecidable proposition 𝑃, for which neither 𝑃 nor ~𝑃 is provable.58
Gödel sets the following formulas as the axioms for this system with the logical symbols
used in the previously defined way:
I.

1. 𝑓(𝑥1 ) = 0
2. 𝑓(𝑥1 ) = 𝑓(𝑦1 ) → 𝑥1 = 𝑦1
3. 𝑥2 (0), 𝑥1 ∀(𝑥2 (𝑥1 ) → 𝑥2 (𝑓(𝑥1 )) → 𝑥1 ∀(𝑥2 (𝑥1 ))
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II.

All formulas resulting from substitution for p, q, and r respectively and hold:
1. 𝑝 ∨ 𝑞 → 𝑝
2. 𝑝 → 𝑝 ∨ 𝑞
3. 𝑝 ∨ 𝑞 → 𝑞 ∨ 𝑝
4. (𝑝 → 𝑝) → (𝑟 ∨ 𝑝 → 𝑟 ∨ 𝑞)

III.

Any formula resulting from either:
1.𝑣 ∀(𝑎) → 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑣
2.𝑣 ∀(𝑏 ∨ 𝑎) → 𝑏 ∨ 𝑣 ∀(𝑎)
where 𝑣, 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 are substituted for any variable, any formula, any formula where 𝑣 is
not free, and any sign of the same time as 𝑐, respectively.

IV.

Every formula resulting from
1. ∃𝑢(𝑣 ∀(𝑢(𝑣) ≡ 𝑎)
when 𝑣 is substituted for some variable of type 𝑛, 𝑢 for a variable of type 𝑛+1, and 𝑎 for
some formula where 𝑢 is not free.

V.

Any formula resulting from:
𝑥1 ∀(𝑥2 (𝑥1 ) ≡ 𝑦2 (𝑥1 )) → 𝑥2 = 𝑦2
showing that a class is fully determined by its elements.59
Gödel defines PM’s class signs to be formulas of PM with exactly one free variable of the

natural numbers. The class signs of PM are also called the class of classes. Gödel assumes there
is a sequence of the class signs denoted by 𝐹(𝑥), the statement form, where both the class signs
and the sequence relation can be defined in PM. Gödel also assumes the relation 𝑥 = [𝑦; 𝑧] is
defined in PM, and thus, we now define a class 𝐾 of natural numbers as
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𝑥 ∈ 𝐾 ≡ ~𝐵𝑒𝑤[(𝐹(𝑥); 𝑥] where 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑥) represents that 𝑥 is a provable formula.60 Because all
parts of 𝐾 can be defined in PM, 𝐾 itself can be defined in PM. Thus, there exists a class 𝑆 such
that [𝑆; 𝑛] can be defined in PM to say that the natural number 𝑛 belongs to 𝐾. As 𝑆 is a class
sign, it is equivalent to some sequence 𝐹(𝑞) such that 𝑆 = 𝐹(𝑞) for some natural number 𝑞.61
Gödel takes some proposition (𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) and assumes it is provable. By the definition
presented in PM, it would then also be true, but by the definition of the proposition, n is a
member of class 𝐾. Thus, ~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹))would hold, but this contradicts our initial assumption
that it is provable. Gödel then assumes the negation of (𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) is provable. Then, the natural
number n is not a member of 𝐾, and 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) would hold. However, both a statement and
its negation cannot hold, so this is impossible. Gödel then continues to further discuss the proof.

Gödel Numbering

The first step in understanding the Incompleteness theorems is to understand the concept
of Gödel numbers. Gödel assigns a numeric value first to each primitive sign of the system. For
example, 0 mapped to 1, 𝑓, function notation, to 3, ↔, the biconditional, to 5, ∨, or, to 7, ∀, the
universal quantifier, to 9, (, the left parenthesis, to 11, and ), the right parenthesis, to 13. To
create the Gödel number for each unique statement, he then uses the sequence of prime numbers,
2, 3, 5, and so on, as the base value and the mapped values of the symbols as the exponent. He
then multiplies all the terms to determine the final Gödel number for each statement. The Gödel
number for every unique mathematical statement is unique because Gödel created a prime
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factorization of each statement's final value, and by the properties of prime factorization, this is
unique.62 Gödel denotes the Gödel number of some statement form 𝐹(𝑥) with 𝐺(𝐹).

Deductive Relation

Gödel defines a proof as a, “finite sequence of primitive signs . . . [and] [s]imilarly, . . .
nothing more than a finite sequence of formulas.”63 He continues by creating a deductive rule,
notated here as 𝐷1 , that would take two sentences, 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 , and reduce them into one sentence,
𝑆. He calls this relation of 𝑆1 𝑆2 to be some 𝑅1 that represents some natural numbers 𝑛 and 𝑚
such that 𝑛 and 𝑚 are related. This relation shows that 𝑛 is the Gödel number for 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 while
𝑚 is the Gödel number for 𝑆1, 𝑆2 , and 𝑆. Gödel can then show with the relation given above if 𝑛
and 𝑚 are related for any statements in any proof. This relation 𝑅1 between 𝑛 and 𝑚 remains
incredibly important throughout the rest of the proof and will be continually referenced in
various forms.
Gödel shows that we can now represent any logical system as a finite list of deductive
rules 𝐷1 through 𝐷𝑛 and their corresponding relations 𝑅1 through 𝑅𝑛 . This deductive rule means
every proof is a list of provable statements deduced down to some final 𝑆 from which we can
derive its Gödel number. The deductive rule also shows us that every statement in a proof is
either an axiom or can be deduced to an axiom. Thus, every statement in our proof should be
able to be proven by our given axioms. Gödel defines the Gödel number of a proof by defining a
statement 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑥, 𝑦) to be provable for every natural 𝑥 and 𝑦 if and only if 𝑥 is the Gödel
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number of a proof of the statement 𝑆, and 𝑦 is the Gödel number of 𝑆 itself. We can see that this
statement follows directly from the relation 𝑅1 defined between numbers 𝑛 and 𝑚.64

Self-Referential Statement

Now that we have established the basic setup of the deductive relations and defined
Gödel numbers, we can transition into the proof by way of contradiction Gödel used to prove
incompleteness. Gödel sets 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) to be the relation between two numbers 𝑛 and 𝐺(𝐹)
where 𝑛 is a Gödel number and 𝐺(𝐹), the Gödel number for some statement form 𝐹(𝑦) with a
free variable 𝑦 that corresponds to the statement "𝑛 is not the Gödel number of the proof of
𝐹(𝐺(𝐹))." 𝐹(𝐺(𝐹)) is the statement form 𝐹 taking its Gödel number 𝐺(𝐹) as its argument.
Finally, 𝐵𝑒𝑤 is the logical operator representing the possible probability of 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) or
~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)). To determine if 𝐵𝑒𝑤 or ~𝐵𝑒𝑤 is provable, Gödel replaces every instance of 𝐹
with the Gödel number of 𝐹, and he then computes the Gödel number of 𝐹(𝐺(𝐹)).65
Gödel then shows that for every Gödel number 𝑛 and formula 𝐹(𝑦), 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) is the
relation between two numbers 𝑛, a Gödel number, and 𝐺(𝐹)), the Gödel number of 𝐹(𝑦), as
seen in the deductive relation 𝑅1 previously. So, 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) is provable if the finite list of
formulas encoded by 𝑛 is not a proof of 𝐹(𝐺(𝐹)), and ~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) is provable if the finite
list of formulas encoded by 𝑛 is a proof of 𝐹(𝐺(𝐹)) as seen by the definition of the statement
𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)). Here, we begin to see where the issue of contradiction in our system arises.
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Given any numbers 𝑛 and 𝐺(𝐹)), either 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) or ~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) is provable,
but not both by the formal roles of consistency of logical systems. Gödel defines the system to
show that any proof of 𝐹(𝐺(𝐹)) can be defined by a Gödel number 𝑛, such that 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹))
does not hold. If 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) holds for all natural numbers 𝑛, then there is no proof of
𝐹(𝐺(𝐹)). In other words, ∀𝑦, 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑦, 𝐺(𝐹)), a formula about natural numbers maps to "there is
no proof of 𝐹(𝐺(𝐹))." Here Gödel is allowing the proof to talk about itself through the math
itself. Within this self-referential formula, Gödel sets his trap.
Gödel then lets 𝑃(𝑥) =∀𝑦, 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑥, 𝑦), where 𝑥 is a free variable, and 𝑃 has a Gödel
number of 𝐺(𝑃). He then replaces 𝑥 with the Gödel number 𝐺(𝐹)) which corresponds to 𝑃(𝑧),
where 𝑧 is a free variable. Then, as we have seen, 𝑃(𝐺(𝐹)) = ∀𝑦, 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑦, 𝐺(𝐹)) corresponds to
“there is no proof of 𝐹(𝐺(𝐹)).” Gödel inserts the Gödel number of 𝑃 into the formula such that
𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)) = ∀𝑦, 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑦, 𝐺(𝑃)). Thus, we see the formula containing the Gödel number of 𝑃
corresponds to “𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)) is not provable.” This self-referential statement is the center point of
the proof as the statement is essentially saying through Gödel’s construct, “I am not provable.”

Undecidability

Finally, Gödel presents the full undecidability of his theorem utilizing everything we
have established so far. Assume 𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)) = ∀𝑦, 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑦, 𝐺(𝑃)) is provable. Let 𝑛 be the Gödel
number of a proof of 𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)). Then, as seen earlier, the formula ~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝐹)) is provable.
However, both ~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝑃)) and ∀𝑦, 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑦, 𝐺(𝑃)) cannot be provable, and thus, this
system is inconsistent. We, therefore, determine that 𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)) is not provable. We now assume
~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝑃)) is provable for any natural number 𝑛. Then, 𝑛 must be the Gödel number of a
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proof of 𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)). However, we have shown that 𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)) is not provable. Since neither
𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝑃)) nor ~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝑃)) is provable, we conclude that, for all natural numbers
𝑛, 𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝑃)) is provable. To complete the proof, Gödel shows the negation of 𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)),
~𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)) = ∃𝑥, ~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑥, 𝐺(𝑃)), is provable. Proving both ∃𝑥, ~𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑥, 𝐺(𝑃)), and
𝐵𝑒𝑤(𝑛, 𝐺(𝑃)), for all natural numbers 𝑛, violates ω-consistency of the formal theory. Thus if the
theory is ω-consistent, ~𝑃(𝐺(𝑃)) is not provable. We see once again that this contradicts the
system we have created, and thus, the system is not consistent or complete.

Influences

The Incompleteness theorems acted as a response to the gaps left in Russell and
Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. While Gödel most directly confronts PM in the theorems,
He references and alludes to the ideas and works of several other philosophers and
mathematicians.
As it influenced PM, Hilbert’s monumental efforts in mathematics laid the groundwork
for the Incompleteness theorems. As introduced in 1921, Hilbert’s program proposed a
foundation for mathematics based on axiomatic systems that can all be found consistent with
certain restrictions. These ideas, also known as logical formalism, were nearly universal in the
mathematical world of the 1920s, and Hilbert based this on ideas of finitary proof systems. These
are any proof that can be translated into a finite amount of logical symbols and formulas.
Initially, Gödel did not believe his theorems disproved Hilbert’s program. Gödel states in the
Incompleteness paper, “I wish to note expressly that [this] . . . does not contradict Hilbert’s
formalistic viewpoint. For this viewpoint presupposes only the existence of a consistency proof

46

in which nothing but finitary means of proof is used, and it is conceivable that there exist finitary
proofs that cannot be expressed in the formalism of 𝑃.”66 He further explains in a letter to
mathematician Jacques Herbrand in 1931 that he feels formalism cannot be broken as it cannot
be adequately defined in a mathematical sense.67
Hilbert’s influence can also be seen through his famous twenty-three problems. Hilbert
presented the problems at the International Congress of Mathematicians in 1900 as a challenge to
the mathematics community. The twenty-three, and later a discovered twenty-fourth, problems
served as open questions regarding the foundations of mathematics Hilbert desired for the
mathematical community to answer. Hilbert presented the second question of the set as,
above all I wish to designate the following as the most important among the numerous
questions which can be asked with regard to the axioms: To prove that they are not
contradictory, . . . a direct method is needed for the proof of the compatibility of the
arithmetical axioms. . . I am convinced that it must be possible to find a direct proof for
the compatibility of the arithmetical axioms.68
Hilbert believed a solution to this gap in the foundation could be found, and with this challenge
set, many mathematicians of the early-twentieth-century would attempt to find the proof in
which Hilbert remained so confident.
While Hilbert formally set the masses onto the challenge, the quest for a consistent and
complete set of axioms for all arithmetic had been ongoing since the 1870s. Georg Cantor
famously founded the field of set theory in the 1870s, and Cantor proved many important
theorems and characteristics of sets and functions fundamental to mathematics today. Yet,
despite his many achievements, there remained issues with the set theory in place in the early-
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twentieth century. In response to these issues, two major mathematical works regarding systems
of set theory were developed in the first two decades of the twentieth-century.
First came Russell and Whitehead’s massive Principia Mathematica in 1910. With PM,
Russell and Whitehead set out to fix the paradoxes they found within the current systems of set
theory with a new system. They also stated a desire to create a system with the fewest and most
simple axioms possible, calling back to the formalism of Hilbert.69 Gödel most notably utilizes
the system established in PM to create his undecidable statements. He also states his theorems
directly respond to the feelings of completeness surrounding the system of PM: [o]ne might
therefore conjecture that these axioms and rules of inference are sufficient to decide any
mathematical question that can be at all formally expressed in these systems.”70 Thus, Russell
and Whitehead’s influence can be seen through the theorems as Gödel utilizes their system and
underlying ideas as a basis for his ideas and proof.
Similar to Russell and Whitehead’s concerns, the Zermelo-Fraenkel system, another
major work of set theory, came from an attempt at a consistent system. First published in 1908
by Ernst Zermelo, the system attempted to avoid paradoxes such as those discovered by Russell.
Abraham Fraenkel contacted Zermelo in 1921 with a refinement to further generalize the system,
and the Zermelo-Fraenkel system remains mainly intact to the present as the basis for modern set
theory. John von Neumann further expanded upon the Zermelo-Fraenkel system to create a more
restricted system that does not utilize proper classes, and Paul Bernays further extended von
Neumann’s ideas in the late 1920s. Gödel’s works in consistency, including his later work on the
axiom of choice in 1940, are seen as the last piece in what is formally known as von Neumann-
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Bernays-Gödel set theory, and this is considered a fundamental idea in the history of set theory
as it introduced classes. Gödel once again references the assumptions of completeness
surrounding PM and ZF as a touchstone for his work, but in contrast to PM, Gödel utilizes ZF
primarily as an axiom system and stylistic choice rather than a methodological cornerstone.71
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Concluding Remarks

The history of mathematics is a vast and largely unexplored field. Through this thesis’s
attempt at creating a more holistic and intensive methodology for research in the area, Gödel’s
work and life were brought together into a fuller picture than seen before. Gödel’s work in
Completeness and Incompleteness served as the prime vehicle for this methodology’s first
outing. While achieving many of the goals set out initially, the work done here is incomplete. In
the future, in addition to being further applied to the topic of Gödel and his theorems, the
methodology employed should be expanded and utilized on a broader array of mathematics and
mathematicians from across time and space. One example of another application of this method
could be the work of Georg Cantor. Cantor’s work in cardinality and the transfinite number
caused outrage and ostracization from the mathematics community. This is interesting in contrast
to Gödel’s life and work, as his groundbreaking contributions were quickly accepted and lauded
after a short period of hesitancy. A possible explanation for the discrepancy in the two
experiences may lie in times of pre-war and post-war and the ensuing influences on the
receptions of Cantor and Gödel, respectively. Due to the nature of Gödel and his colleagues, this
work remains incredibly eurocentric, but in the future, this could be rectified with further
research into the mathematical and philosophical world outside of Europe at the time. Future
applications of this methodology should strive to include explorations into less represented areas
and mathematicians, as well.
Finally, without the restriction of time and place, extensive further investigation could be
done into Gödel’s personal writings and historical context. As the full breadth of Gödel’s
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writings are only available in the closed archives of Princeton University, a full analysis of these
documents was not a feasible task for the current undertaking. Additionally, while conducting
historical research, it quickly became clear that the contents of the section could easily span
dozens of pages. Thus, editorial choices were made to cull the section down to a reasonable size
due to time restraints. In the future, the historical considerations sections could be expanded to
better represent the full nuance and influence of the times.
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